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To better assess the risk for transmission of the severe
acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV), we obtained serial specimens and clinical
and exposure data from seven confirmed U.S. SARS
patients and their 10 household contacts. SARS-CoV was
detected in a day-14 sputum specimen from one case-
patient and in five stool specimens from two case-patients.
In one case-patient, SARS-CoV persisted in stool for at
least 26 days after symptom onset. The highest amounts of
virus were in the day-14 sputum sample and a day-14 stool
sample. Residual respiratory symptoms were still present
in recovered SARS case-patients 2 months after illness
onset. Possible transmission of SARS-CoV occurred in one
household contact, but this person had also traveled to a
SARS-affected area. The data suggest that SARS-CoV is
not always transmitted efficiently. Routine collection and
testing of stool and sputum specimens of probable SARS
case-patients may help the early detection of SARS-CoV
infection.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was recent-
ly described as the clinical manifestation of infection
by a novel coronavirus (CoV), the SARS-associated CoV
(SARS-CoV) (1–5). This syndrome was first recognized in
February 2003 in Vietnam, but it was later realized that the
first cases occurred in southern China in November 2002
(6,7). Subsequently, the infection rapidly spread through-
out the world, and by July 2003, when the World Health
Organization declared that the outbreak was contained,
8,437 cases and 813 deaths in 32 countries had been
reported (8). 
As the outbreak developed, epidemiologic evidence
suggested that SARS-CoV was transmitted by respiratory
droplets or direct contact with infected patients and possi-
bly by fomites (9–12). In certain circumstances, transmis-
sion of SARS-CoV was particularly efficient and resulted
in individual patients infecting large numbers of people
(referred to as “super-spreading events”), whereas in other
situations, no secondary transmission was observed (13).
A better understanding of the duration of SARS-CoV
shedding and virus quantities in respiratory secretions,
stool, urine, and other body fluids and of the risk factors
for spreading illness to close contacts is critical to accu-
rately assess the risk for transmission and to develop effec-
tive control strategies. To that end, we obtained serial bio-
logic specimens and clinical and exposure data for 5 to 10
weeks after onset of illness from seven laboratory-con-
firmed U.S. SARS patients and their household contacts.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We targeted 103 patients who met the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) surveillance
case definition for probable SARS (14). Of these patients,
7 (7%) with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV infection
(antibodies to SARS-CoV were detected) were enrolled;
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declined participation; and 77 (75%) were excluded for
various reasons (negative for SARS-CoV antibody at ≥21
days after illness onset, a confirmed alternative diagnosis,
or foreign citizen not residing in the United States). The
household contacts of seven laboratory-confirmed case-
patients were also enrolled. Household contacts were
defined as persons who had lived in the same household
with SARS case-patients during their illness. All partici-
pants provided informed consent. 
Timeline for Follow-up Visits
Follow-up visits were scheduled twice a week for the
first 3 weeks after illness onset and then once a week for 2
weeks. If a case-patient was first enrolled after week 5 of
illness, then a follow-up visit was made as soon as feasible
after enrollment. Some case-patients were enrolled at >5
weeks after illness onset and, therefore, were followed up
for >10 weeks. For household contacts, visits were sched-
uled once weekly for a period of 4 weeks after initial expo-
sure to the case-patient. A single follow-up visit was
scheduled if the household contact was enrolled >4 weeks
after initial exposure to the case-patient. 
Clinical and Epidemiologic Data 
At the initial visit with the SARS case-patients, we col-
lected data on demographics, date of illness onset, clinical
symptoms, and exposure history. At the initial visit with
household contacts, we gathered data on any illness they
had had since their exposure to the case-patient and on the
types and patterns of exposure (e.g., sleeping in the same
room at night, daily contact within <3 feet, and direct skin-
to-skin contact, such as kissing or hugging, with case-
patients). At each subsequent visit, we collected informa-
tion on any symptoms experienced by case-patients or
household contacts since their previous visit, including
symptoms during the current visit. 
Clinical Specimens
Specimens collected as a part of the diagnostic work-up
were available for this investigation, and at each posten-
rollment visit, participants were asked to provide whole-
blood, serum, stool, urine, nasopharyngeal, and oropharyn-
geal swab specimens. We obtained 1–10 mL of blood from
adults and 0.5–5 mL of blood from children <3 years old
by venipuncture or finger stick. Clotted blood was cen-
trifuged, and serum was separated before being shipped to
CDC for testing. Similar volumes of whole blood were
collected in a tube containing EDTA. Nasopharyngeal and
oropharyngeal samples were collected by use of a single
Dacron swab with a nonwooden shaft; the swab was then
placed in a sterile vial containing 2 mL of viral transport
medium. Stool specimens were collected in a sterile con-
tainer and sealed. Participants provided a 50-mL clean-
catch collection of urine in a sterile urine cup. Specimens
were processed and stored according to CDC laboratory
biosafety guidelines (15). All specimens were stored at
4°C for a maximum of 72 h and shipped on ice to the CDC
laboratory. If shipping within 72 h was not feasible, speci-
mens were stored at –70°C and then shipped. 
Laboratory Methods 
To detect SARS-CoV in stool, urine, and respiratory
specimens, we performed reverse transcriptase–poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR), using primers targeted to
the polymerase and nucleocapsid genes of the SARS-CoV
genome, as described elsewhere (2, Emery et al., unpub
data). Stool samples were prepared as 10% extracts in Tris-
HCl buffer before isolation of total nucleic acid for RT-
PCR testing. To quantify the virus load in respiratory and
stool specimens, quantitative RT-PCR was performed
using the TaqMan assay and standard curves generated
from synthetic RNA transcripts (S. S. Monroe and R. S.
Beard, unpub. data). Previously described culture tech-
niques (2) were used to isolate SARS-CoV from speci-
mens. To determine the S and N gene sequences of SARS-
CoV, a set of 10 overlapping RT-PCR products, which
cover the entire open reading frames of the S (8 products)
and N (2 products) genes, were generated by using the
SuperScript One-Step RT-PCR with Platinum Taq
(Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA) and sequenced by using 16 (S
gene) or 7 (N gene) sequencing primers (S. Tong et al,
unpub. data). Serum specimens were tested for SARS-
CoV–associated antibodies by use of an enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay and an indirect fluorescent antibody
test, using previously described methods (2). Serum spec-
imens were considered positive only if results for both
tests were positive using predetermined cut-offs (2).
Results
Follow-up Findings
Five of seven enrolled case-patients provided data on
residual symptoms. Three case-patients reported shortness
of breath that persisted at least until days 50, 56, and 62,
respectively, after onset of fever. Two case-patients report-
ed residual coughing: case-patient 4 reported a dry cough
until day 50 and case-patient 2 reported a productive cough
until day 56 after onset of fever. These symptoms had been
reported during the acute phase of each case-patient’s ill-
ness. Wheezing developed in one case-patient without a
previous history of respiratory disease at day 11 of illness
and persisted at least until day 46. No data were available
to characterize the progression of symptoms over time. 
Of 41 respiratory specimens obtained from seven case-
patients (Table 1), 4 (10%) were sputum samples from two
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patient 7). SARS-CoV was detected by both RT-PCR and
viral culture in the sputum sample of case-patient 5, which
was collected at day 14 after illness onset (Figure). All
other respiratory specimens, including seven nasopharyn-
geal and oropharyngeal swab samples collected during the
first 2 weeks of illness from five case-patients, tested neg-
ative by RT-PCR.
A total of 14 stool specimens were obtained from seven
case-patients: two patients provided 4 samples each, one
patient had 2 samples, and four had 1 sample each. SARS-
CoV RNA was detected in five specimens, all of which
came from two case-patients (one specimen from case-
patient 6 and four specimens from case-patient 7) (Figure).
The single positive stool specimen from case-patient 6 was
obtained 19 days after onset; his subsequent stool specimens
(collected at days 23, 32, and 44) tested negative for SARS-
CoV by RT-PCR. The first stool specimen from case-patient
7 was collected on day 14 of illness; viral RNA was detect-
ed in all four of his stools, including the last one, which was
collected at day 26. SARS-CoV was not isolated by culture
from any of the RT-PCR–positive stool specimens.
The highest concentrations of SARS-CoV were detect-
ed in sputum from case-patient 5 (43 million copies per
gram of specimen) and in the day-14 stool from case-
patient 7 (37 million copies per gram of specimen) (Table
2). After day 14 of illness, the concentration of virus in
stool specimens from case-patient 7 dropped by 20-fold or
more. Of note, this case-patient reported moderate diarrhea
from days 2 to 12 of illness. Case-patient 6 had only mild
diarrhea during the first 4 days of illness, and the amount
of virus in his stool sample that was collected on day 19
(i.e., 2 weeks after the resolution of diarrhea) was approx-
imately 800-fold lower than the amount in the day-14 stool
sample of case-patient 7 and approximately 50-fold lower
than that found in subsequent specimens from case-patient
7. No evidence was found that the virus mutated in case-
patient 7 during the infection: genomic sequences of S and
N genes of SARS-CoV from all positive stool specimens
of this case-patient were identical. 
No viral RNA was detected by RT-PCR in any of the
eight urine specimens collected from the seven case-
patients. SARS-CoV antibody was first found as early as
days 10 and 11 after illness onset in three of seven case-
patients. Adequate specimens were not available to charac-
terize the time of first detectable SARS-CoV antibody in
the remaining four case-patients (Table 3). 
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Table 1. Timing of collection of clinical specimens from seven confirmed SARS case-patients, United States, 2003  
No. of specimens (no. of case-patients) by no. of days after illness onset 
Specimen type  0–14 days  15–28 days  >28 days   Total no. of specimens 
Respiratory  11 (7)  12 (4)  18 (7)  41 
Sputum  2 (2)  2 (1)  0 (0)  4 
NP swab  5 (5)  4 (4)  9 (6)  18 
OP swab  2 (2)  6 (4)  9 (7)  17 
Nasal aspirate  1 (1)  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 
Nasal wash  1 (1)  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 
Stool  1 (1)  5 (2)  8 (6)  14 
Urine  0 (0)  2 (2)  6 (5)  8 
Serum/blood  18 (7)  15 (4)  15 (7)  48 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; NP, nasopharyngeal; OP, oropharyngeal. 
Figure. Detecting severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) RNA by reverse transcriptase-poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and SARS-CoV antibodies by
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) in clinical speci-
mens from seven confirmed SARS case-patients, United States,
2003. Circle within circle: blood specimens (same symbol repre-
sents both whole blood and serum when both specimens are col-
lected and results are entirely concordant. s, serum; wb, whole
blood (symbols are labeled s or wb if either blood or serum was
collected). Blocked symbols denote SARS-CoV-positive speci-
mens by ELISA.  : respiratory specimens (include np, nasopha-
ryngeal swab; nw, nasal wash; a, nasal aspirate; op, oropharyn-
geal swab; sp, sputum).  : stool.  : urine. Blocked symbols
denote SARS-CoV-positive specimens by RT-PCR. 
   
 Household Transmission 
Ten household contacts of five of the seven SARS case-
patients were enrolled. Case-patient 1 had four household
contacts, case-patients 3 and 4 had one such contact each,
and case-patients 6 and 7 had two household contacts each.
Of the 10 household contacts, 4 were female, 2 were smok-
ers, and 2 reported previous history of respiratory problems
(sarcoidosis in household contact 5 and pulmonary em-
bolus in household contact 7).
Household contact 1 (who was also case-patient 2) was
the only such contact who tested positive for SARS-CoV
antibody. The remaining nine household contacts were
negative for SARS-CoV antibody in specimens collected
>28 days after their initial exposure to a case-patient. The
infected household contact was the wife of confirmed
SARS case-patient 1. The couple had visited Hong Kong
together in early March 2003 and stayed at Hotel M, which
was subsequently linked to the initial spread of SARS (16),
where they had multiple opportunities for exposure. Case-
patient 1 became ill 7 days after returning to the United
States from Hong Kong. Symptoms developed in house-
hold contact 1 some 13 days after returning to the United
States and 6 days after onset of illness in her husband.
SARS-like symptoms did not develop in any of the three
other household contacts of case-patient 1, nor did any
have laboratory evidence of SARS-CoV infection. The
analysis of household exposures and protective measures
in this household indicated that household contact 1 had
more frequent unprotected contact with the index patient
compared with three other household contacts (Table 4).
The remaining six uninfected household contacts
reported close contact (e.g., contact within 3 feet and
unprotected skin-to-skin contact) with case-patients. The
exposure of four household contacts of two case-patients
with stool specimens positive for SARS-CoV was limited
by isolation of the case-patients in a separate room with a
private bathroom during the first week of illness. Both
case-patients also wore surgical masks during this period,
as did three of their four household contacts. Case-patient
7 was hospitalized from day 11 to day 18 of illness, the
period during which the highest amounts of virus were
detected in his stool, and continued to be positive for
SARS-CoV in stool after discharge. Neither case-patient 7
nor his two household contacts wore surgical masks after
being discharged from the hospital. Case-patient 6, who
was never hospitalized, had low-level shedding of SARS-
CoV in stool on day 19, but no virus was subsequently
found in his stool specimens. One of his two household
contacts wore a mask until 10 days after the resolution of
fever in the case-patient. 
Discussion 
In this investigation of U.S. SARS-CoV–infected per-
sons and their household contacts, we identified probable
transmission of SARS-CoV to only 1 of 10 such contacts.
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Table 2. Quantities of SARS-CoV in sputum and stool specimens from three confirmed SARS case-patients, as measured by 
quantitative RT-PCR, United States, 2003
a 
Case-patient identification no.  Specimen 
Time of specimen collection after  
illness onset (no. of days)  Copies per gram of sample 
5  Sputum  14  43,000,000 
7  Stool  14  37,000,000 
  Stool  18  1,600,000 
  Stool  21  930,000 
  Stool  26  2,300,000 
6  Stool  19  45,000 
aSARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus; RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction. 
Table 3. SARS-CoV antibodies as determined by enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay in seven confirmed SARS case-patients, 
by number of days after illness onset, United States, 2003
a 
Case-patient  Days after illness onset  SARS-CoV antibodies
b 
Patient 1  6  Negative 
  34  1,600 
Patient 2  4  Negative 
  28  6,400 
  64  6,400 
Patient 3  6  Negative 
  25  6,400 
  46  1,600 
  71  1,600 
Patient 4  2  Negative 
  5  Negative 
  13  Negative 
  30  6,400 
Patient 5  14  Negative 
  41  1,600 
Patient 6  10  1,600 
  11  1,600 
  15  6,400 
  23  6,400 
Patient 7  11  400 
  15  1,600 
  18  6,400 
  21  6,400 
  26  1,600 
  32  6,400 
aSARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus.
 
bReciprocal of dilution. We detected SARS-CoV in fecal and respiratory speci-
mens and found that SARS case-patients may have high
concentrations of virus in stools during the 2nd week of ill-
ness and continue to shed the virus in feces until at least 26
days after onset of symptoms. The amount of SARS-CoV
in stool from a case-patient with moderate diarrhea was
similarly high to the quantity seen in a sputum specimen
collected from a different case-patient at the same interval
after illness onset. However, no virus could be cultured
from any stool specimens that were PCR-positive for
SARS-CoV, suggesting that SARS-CoV in feces may be
present in the form of either nonviable viral particles or
antibody-coated virus. 
The one household contact who became infected was
the person who had more contact with the potential source
case-patient during the first week of illness than did other
members in the household. This contact was also exposed
in Hong Kong along with her husband; however, she
became ill >10 days after returning to the United States
(16). Previously reported data suggest that the incubation
period for SARS ranges from 2 to 10 days (4,17), but in
some cases, the incubation period may be as long as
14 days (18). Therefore, the possibility remains that this
contact may have been infected in Hong Kong. The
remaining uninfected household contacts included four
contacts of two case-patients with positive stool specimens
in whose households simple infection-control procedures
were implemented during the acute phase of illness in the
index patient. 
The lack of widespread household transmission of
SARS found in our investigation is similar to findings in
reports of the outbreak in Toronto, where 2 (6%) of 33
household contacts were infected despite unprotected con-
tact with a SARS case-patient (19), and from the
Philippines, where <1% of nonhospital contacts were
reported to be infected (20). This finding supports the idea
that in certain circumstances, SARS-CoV is not easily
transmitted. Transmission may also be more likely to occur
at the time when patients are shedding higher amounts of
virus, and this period may coincide with their hospitaliza-
tion, thus decreasing the degree of exposure for household
contacts. 
We were unable to detect SARS-CoV in specimens of
our case-patients before day 14 after illness onset. We only
detected virus in three case-patients: in a sputum sample of
one patient at day 14 and in stool samples of two patients
at day >14. All upper respiratory specimens in the first 2
weeks after onset were negative for SARS-CoV by RT-
PCR; this finding differs from a report in Hong Kong,
where viral RNAwas detected in nasopharyngeal aspirates
of 68% of case-patients at day 14 (21). Our inability to
detect the virus in early respiratory samples may be asso-
ciated with the type (nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal
swabs versus nasopharyngeal aspirates) of collected spec-
imens, as well as with low amounts of virus generally seen
in such specimens (1). Sputum samples may have a higher
concentration of virus than upper respiratory specimens
(1), consistent with our findings. Stool specimens have
been found positive more frequently than upper respirato-
ry specimens during the 2nd and 3rd week of illness,
which is in accord with the limited results of this study.
The inability to detect SARS-CoV in urine may be the
result of a late collection of urine specimens (>14 days
after illness onset). A wider use of steroids in treatment of
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Table 4. Profile and exposure of 10 household contacts (HHCs) of five confirmed SARS case-patients, United States, 2003  
Exposure to the case-patient before 
hospitalization 
Protective measures by 
HHC 
HHC 
no. 
Case-patient 
identification 
no. (n=5) 
Shedding 
documented 
in case-
patient 
Use of 
surgical 
mask by 
case-
patient 
SARS-
CoV 
infection 
in HHC 
HHC 
relation 
to case-
patient 
Age 
(y)/sex/ 
race 
No. of 
days in 
house 
with 
case-
patient 
No. of 
nights 
in 
same 
room 
Contact 
within 3 
feet 
(h/day) 
Skin-to-
skin contact 
(times/day) 
Surgical 
mask 
used 
during 
1st week 
of 
illness 
Routine 
handwashing 
with soap 
1
b  1  No  No  Yes  Spouse  37/F/A  4  5–6  0–1  >3  No  No
c 
2        No  Brother  57/M/A  4  0  1–3  0  No  No
c 
3        No  Brother-
in-law  55/M/A  4  0  0–1  0  No  Yes 
4        No  Nephew  16/M/A  4  0  0–1  0  No  Yes 
5  3  No  No  No  Spouse  52/M/W  6  7  >7  >3  No  Yes 
6  4  No  No  No  Mother  52/F/W  4  0  >7  >3  No  Yes 
7  6
d  Yes  Yes  No  Spouse  47/F/W  All
e  0  0–1  1–2  Yes  Yes 
8        No  Son  12/M/W  All
e  0  1–3  1–2  No  Yes 
9  7
f  Yes  Yes  No  Son  22/M/A  11  0  0–1  1–2  Yes  Yes 
10        No  Daughter  15/F/A  11  0  0–1  0  Yes  Yes 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome;
 F, female; M, male; A, Asian; W, white. 
bSARS coronavirus antibody–positive HHC. 
cNo soap used for handwashing (water only). 
dShedding documented in stool on day 19 after onset of illness. 
eCase-patient 6 was never hospitalized. 
fShedding documented in stool on days 14, 18, 21, and 26 after onset of illness. case-patients in Hong Kong compared with case-patients
in the United States may have also altered the pattern of
shedding of SARS-CoV.
Persistent respiratory symptoms that were reported up
until at least 2 months after onset by most of our case-
patients were similar to symptoms observed by Avendano
et al. (19) in a study of Canadian healthcare workers who
were followed for 5 weeks after illness onset, suggesting
residual illness in SARS case-patients. However, the pro-
gression of these symptoms over time is difficult to inter-
pret without a better appreciation of the pre-illness symp-
toms. Antibody to SARS-CoV in some case-patients was
documented as early as day 10 after illness onset. We did
not have an adequate number of early serum specimens
from other case-patients to determine when SARS-CoV
antibody is first detectable. 
Results of this investigation should be interpreted in
light of several limitations. The small number of partici-
pants does not allow for accurate estimation of the risk for
transmission to household members. Irregular and long
intervals between collections of specimens do not permit a
clear picture of the natural history of SARS-CoV infection,
including documenting the precise timing of the first
appearance of SARS-CoV antibody. We also may have
missed the presence of shedding in stools of other case-
patients who had reported diarrhea during the acute phase
of illness. Possible variations in specimen collection and
handling techniques could also have affected SARS-CoV
detection rates in respiratory and stool specimens.
Our results suggest that SARS-CoV is not always trans-
mitted efficiently. Routine collection and testing of stool
and sputum specimens of probable SARS case-patients
may help the early detection of SARS-CoV infection. A
follow-up of recovered SARS case-patients over several
months would also help to better assess possible waning of
antibody titers and long-term sequelae of the disease and,
thus, improve our understanding of the true illness associ-
ated with SARS-CoV infection.
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RESEARCH SARS TRANSMISSION
The International Conference on Women’s
Health and Infectious Diseases, sponsored by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and partners, will be held at the Marriott Marquis,
Atlanta, Georgia, February 27–28, 2004. Intended
for clinicians, scientists, women’s health advocates,
health educators, public health workers, academi-
cians, and representatives from all levels of govern-
ment and from community-based, nonprofit, philan-
thropic, and international organizations, the confer-
ence will promote prevention and control of infec-
tious diseases among women worldwide. 
Featured sessions will include women and
HIV/AIDS, perinatal infectious diseases, immu-
nizations, links between infectious and chronic dis-
eases, and the impact of globalization. Other topics
include infectious disease disparities, gender-appro-
priate interventions, and effective health communi-
cation. 
Speakers will include, Julie L. Gerberding, CDC
director, who will speak about the impact of infec-
tious diseases on women; Carol Bellamy, executive
director, United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), who will speak about globalization and
its effect on infectious diseases among women; and
Mirta Roses Periago, director, Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), will speak about prevention
of infectious diseases among women globally. 
International Conference on Women and 
Infectious Diseases: from Science to Action
For information, about cost and registration, contact the Office of Minority and Women’s Health, National Center
for Infectious Diseases, CDC, at Web site: www.womenshealthconf.org; email: omwh@cdc.gov; or phone:
BeJaye Roberts, 404-371-5492.